Collective response of human populations to large-scale emergencies by Bagrow, James P. et al.
Collective response of human populations to large-scale
emergencies
James P. Bagrow1,2,*, Dashun Wang1,2,*, and Albert-La´szlo´ Baraba´si1,2,3
1Center for Complex Network Research, Department of Physics, Northeastern University, Boston, MA
02115.
2Center for Cancer Systems Biology, Dana-Farber Cancer Institute, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
3Department of Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, MA 02115, USA.
*These authors contributed equally to this work.
March 1, 2011
Despite recent advances in uncovering the quantitative features of stationary hu-
man activity patterns, many applications, from pandemic prediction to emer-
gency response, require an understanding of how these patterns change when
the population encounters unfamiliar conditions. To explore societal response
to external perturbations we identified real-time changes in communication and
mobility patterns in the vicinity of eight emergencies, such as bomb attacks and
earthquakes, comparing these with eight non-emergencies, like concerts and sport-
ing events. We find that communication spikes accompanying emergencies are
both spatially and temporally localized, but information about emergencies spreads
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globally, resulting in communication avalanches that engage in a significant man-
ner the social network of eyewitnesses. These results offer a quantitative view of
behavioral changes in human activity under extreme conditions, with potential
long-term impact on emergency detection and response.
Introduction
Current research on human dynamics is limited to data collected under normal and stationary
circumstances [1], capturing the regular daily activity of individuals [2, 2, 4, 5, 3, 1, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 13, 14, 15]. Yet, there is exceptional need to understand how people change their behavior
when exposed to rapidly changing or unfamiliar conditions [1], such as life-threatening epidemic
outbreaks [4, 12], emergencies and traffic anomalies, as models based on stationary events are
expected to break down under these circumstances. Such rapid changes in conditions are often
caused by natural, technological or societal disasters, from hurricanes to violent conflicts [16].
The possibility to study such real time changes has emerged recently thanks to the widespread
use of mobile phones, which track both user mobility [2, 2, 3, 17] and real-time communications
along the links of the underlying social network [1, 18]. Here we take advantage of the fact that
mobile phones act as in situ sensors at the site of an emergency, to study the real-time behavioral
patterns of the local population under external perturbations caused by emergencies. Advances
in this direction not only help redefine our understanding of information propagation [19] and
cooperative human actions under externally induced perturbations, which is the main motivation
of our work, but also offer a new perspective on panic [20, 21, 22, 23] and emergency protocols in
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a data-rich environment [24].
Our starting point is a country-wide mobile communications dataset, culled from the anonymized
billing records of approximately ten million mobile phone subscribers of a mobile company which
covers about one-fourth of subscribers in a country with close to full mobile penetration. It pro-
vides the time and duration of each mobile phone call [1], together with information on the tower
that handled the call, thus capturing the real-time locations of the users [2, 3, 25] (Methods, Sup-
porting Information S1, Fig. A). To identify potential societal perturbations, we scanned media
reports pertaining to the coverage area between January 2007 and January 2009 and developed a
corpus of times and locations for eight societal, technological, and natural emergencies, ranging
from bombings to a plane crash, earthquakes, floods and storms (Table 1). Approximately 30%
of the events mentioned in the media occurred in locations with sparse cellular coverage or during
times when few users are active (like very early in the morning). The remaining events do offer,
however, a sufficiently diverse corpus to explore the generic vs. unique changes in the activity
patterns in response to an emergency. Here we discuss four events, chosen for their diversity: (1)
a bombing, resulting in several injuries (no fatalities); (2) a plane crash resulting in a significant
number of fatalities; (3) an earthquake whose epicenter was outside our observation area but af-
fected the observed population, causing mild damage but no casualties; and (4) a power outage
(blackout) affecting a major metropolitan area (Supporting Information S1, Fig. B). To distinguish
emergencies from other events that cause collective changes in human activity, we also explored
eight planned events, such as sports games and a popular local sports race and several rock con-
certs. We discuss here in detail a cultural festival and a large pop music concert as non-emergency
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references (Table 1, see also Supporting Information S1, Sec. B). The characteristics of the events
not discussed here due to length limitations are provided in Supporting Information S1, Sec. I for
completeness and comparison.
Results and Discussion
As shown in Fig. 1A, emergencies trigger a sharp spike in call activity (number of outgoing calls
and text messages) in the physical proximity of the event, confirming that mobile phones act as
sensitive local “sociometers” to external societal perturbations. The call volume starts decaying
immediately after the emergency, suggesting that the urge to communicate is strongest right at the
onset of the event. We see virtually no delay between the onset of the event and the jump in call
volume for events that were directly witnessed by the local population, such as the bombing, the
earthquake and the blackout. Brief delay is observed only for the plane crash, which took place
in an unpopulated area and thus lacked eyewitnesses. In contrast, non-emergency events, like the
festival and the concert in Fig. 1A, display a gradual increase in call activity, a noticeably different
pattern from the “jump-decay” pattern observed for emergencies. See also Supporting Information
S1, Figs. I and J.
To compare the magnitude and duration of the observed call anomalies, in Fig. 1B we show
the temporal evolution of the relative call volume ∆V/ 〈Vnormal〉 as a function of time, where ∆V =
Vevent − 〈Vnormal〉, Vevent is the call activity during the event and 〈Vnormal〉 is the average call activity
during the same time period of the week. As Fig. 1B indicates, the magnitude of ∆V/ 〈Vnormal〉
correlates with our relative (and somewhat subjective) sense of the event’s potential severity and
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unexpectedness: the bombing induces the largest change in call activity, followed by the plane
crash; whereas the collective reaction to the earthquake and the blackout are somewhat weaker
and comparable to each other. While the relative change was also significant for non-emergencies,
the emergence of the call anomaly is rather gradual and spans seven or more hours, in contrast
with the jump-decay pattern lasting only three to five hours for emergencies (Figs. 1B, Supporting
Information S1, Figs. I and J). As we show in Fig. 1C (see also Supporting Information S1, Sec. C)
the primary source of the observed call anomaly is a sudden increase of calls by individuals who
would normally not use their phone during the emergency period, rather than increased call volume
by those that are normally active in the area.
The temporally localized spike in call activity (Fig. 1A,B) raises an important question: is in-
formation about the events limited to the immediate vicinity of the emergency or do emergencies,
often immediately covered by national media, lead to spatially extended changes in call activ-
ity [23]? We therefore inspected the change in call activity in the vicinity of the epicenter, finding
that for the bombing, for example, the magnitude of the call anomaly is strongest near the event,
and drops rapidly with the distance r from the epicenter (Fig. 1A). To quantify this effect across
all emergencies, we integrated the call volume over time in concentric shells of radius r centered
on the epicenter (Fig. 1B). The decay is approximately exponential, ∆V(r) ∼ exp (−r/rc), allowing
us to characterize the spatial extent of the reaction with a decay rate rc (Fig. 1C). The observed
decay rates range from 2 km (bombing) to 10 km (plane crash), indicating that the anomalous call
activity is limited to the event’s vicinity. An extended spatial range (rc ≈ 110 km) is seen only
for the earthquake, lacking a narrowly defined epicenter. Meanwhile, a distinguishing pattern of
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non-emergencies is their highly localized nature: they are characterized by a decay rate of less than
2 km, implying that the call anomaly was narrowly confined to the venue of the event. This sys-
tematic split in rc between the spatially extended emergencies and well-localized non-emergencies
persists for all explored events (see Table 1, Supporting Information S1, Fig. K).
Despite the clear temporal and spatial localization of anomalous call activity during emergen-
cies, one expects some degree of information propagation beyond the eyewitness population [26].
We therefore identified the individuals located within the event region (G0), as well as a G1 group
consisting of individuals outside the event region but who receive calls from the G0 group during
the event, a G2 group that receive calls from G1, and so on. We see that the G0 individuals engage
their social network within minutes, and that the G1, G2, and occasionally even the G3 group show
an anomalous call pattern immediately after the anomaly (Fig. 1A). This effect is quantified in
Fig. 1B, where we show the increase in call volume for each group as a function of their social
network based distance from the epicenter (for example, the social distance of the G2 group is
2, being two links away from the G0 group), indicating that the bombing and plane crash show
strong, immediate social propagation up to the third and second neighbors of the eyewitness G0
population, respectively. The earthquake and blackout, less threatening emergencies, show little
propagation beyond the immediate social links of G0 and social propagation is virtually absent in
non-emergencies.
The nature of the information cascade behind the results shown in Fig. 1A,B is illustrated in
Fig. 1C, where we show the individual calls between users active during the bombing. In con-
trast with the information cascade triggered by the emergencies witnessed by the G0 users, there
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are practically no calls between the same individuals during the previous week. To quantify the
magnitude of the information cascade we measured the length of the paths emanating from the G0
users, finding them to be considerably longer during the emergency (Fig. 1D), compared to five
non-emergency periods, demonstrating that the information cascade penetrates deep into the social
network, a pattern that is absent during normal activity [27]. See also Supporting Information S1,
Figs. E, F, G, H, L, M, N, and O, and Table A.
The existence of such prominent information cascades raises tantalizing questions about who
contributes to information propagation about the emergency. Using self-reported gender informa-
tion available for most users (see Supporting Information S1), we find that during emergencies
female users are more likely to make a call than expected based on their normal call patterns. This
gender discrepancy holds for the G0 (eyewitness) and G1 groups, but is absent for non-emergency
events (see Supporting Information S1, Sec. E, Fig. C). We also separated the total call activity of
G0 and G1 individuals into voice and text messages (including SMS and MMS). For most events
(the earthquake and blackout being the only exceptions), the voice/text ratios follow the normal
patterns (Supporting Information S1, Fig. D), indicating that users continue to rely on their pre-
ferred means of communication during an emergency.
The patterns identified discussed above allow us to dissect complex events, such as an explosion
in an urban area preceded by an evacuation starting approximately one hour before the blast. While
a call volume anomaly emerges right at the start of the evacuation, it levels off and the jump-decay
pattern characteristic of an emergency does not appear until the real explosion (Fig. 1A). The
spatial extent of the evacuation response is significantly smaller than the one observed during the
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event (rc = 1.6 for the evacuation compared with rc = 9.0 for the explosion, see Fig. 1B). During
the evacuation, social propagation is limited to the G0 and G1 groups only (Fig. 1C,D) while after
the explosion we observe a communication cascade that activates the G2 users as well. The lack
of strong propagation during evacuation indicates that individuals tend to be reactive rather than
proactive and that a real emergency is necessary to initiate a communication cascade that effectively
spreads emergency information.
The results of Figs. ??-?? not only indicate that the collective response of the population to
an emergency follows reproducible patterns common across diverse events, but they also docu-
ment subtle differences between emergencies and non-emergencies. We therefore identified four
variables that take different characteristic values for emergencies and non-emergencies: (i) the
midpoint fraction fmid = (tmid − tstart) /
(
tstop − tstart
)
, where tstart and tstop are the times when the
anomalous activity begins and ends, respectively, and tmid is the time when half of the total anoma-
lous call volume has occurred; (ii) the spatial decay rate rc capturing the extent of the event; (iii)
the relative size R of each information cascade, representing the ratio between the number of users
in the event cascade and the cascade tracked during normal periods; (iv) the probability for users
to contact existing friends (instead of placing calls to strangers).
In Fig. ?? we show these variables for all 16 events, finding systematic differences between
emergencies and non-emergencies. As the figure indicates, a multidimensional variable, relying
on the documented changes in human activity, can be used to automatically distinguish emergency
situations from non-emergency induced anomalies. Such a variable could also help real-time mon-
itoring of emergencies [24], from information about the size of the affected population, to the
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timeline of the events, and could help identify mobile phone users capable of offering immediate,
actionable information, potentially aiding search and rescue.
Rapidly-evolving events such as those studied throughout this work require dynamical data
with ultra-high temporal and spatial resolution and high coverage. Although the populations af-
fected by emergencies are quite large, occasionally reaching thousands of users, due to the demon-
strated localized nature of the anomaly, this size is still small in comparison to other proxy studies
of human dynamics, which can exploit the activity patterns of millions of internet users or web-
pages [13, 14, 15, 27]. Meanwhile, emergencies occur over very short timespans, a few hours
at most, whereas much current work on human dynamics relies on longitudinal datasets covering
months or even years of activity for the same users (e.g. [2, 3, 9]), integrating out transient events
and noise. But in the case of emergencies, such transient events are precisely what we wish to
quantify. Given the short duration and spatially localized nature of these events, it is vital to have
extremely high coverage of the entire system, to maximize the availability of critical information
during an event. To push human dynamics research into such fast-moving events requires new
tools and datasets capable of extracting signals from limited data. We believe that our research
offers a first step in this direction.
In summary, similar to how biologists use drugs to perturb the state of a cell to better under-
stand the collective behavior of living systems, we used emergencies as external societal pertur-
bations, helping us uncover generic changes in the spatial, temporal and social activity patterns of
the human population. Starting from a large-scale, country-wide mobile phone dataset, we used
news reports to gather a corpus of sixteen major events, eight unplanned emergencies and eight
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scheduled activities. Studying the call activity patterns of users in the vicinity of these events, we
found that unusual activity rapidly spikes for emergencies in contrast with non-emergencies in-
duced anomalies that build up gradually before the event; that the call patterns during emergencies
are exponentially localized regardless of event details; and that affected users will only invoke the
social network to propagate information under the most extreme circumstances. When this social
propagation does occur, however, it takes place in a very rapid and efficient manner, so that users
three or even four degrees from eyewitnesses can learn of the emergency within minutes.
These results not only deepen our fundamental understanding of human dynamics, but could
also improve emergency response. Indeed, while aid organizations increasingly use the distributed,
real-time communication tools of the 21st century, much disaster research continues to rely on
low-throughput, post-event data, such as questionnaires, eyewitness reports [28, 29], and commu-
nication records between first responders or relief organizations [30]. The emergency situations
explored here indicate that, thanks to the pervasive use of mobile phones, collective changes in hu-
man activity patterns can be captured in an objective manner, even at surprisingly short time-scales,
opening a new window on this neglected chapter of human dynamics.
Materials and Methods
Dataset
We use a set of anonymized billing records from a western european mobile phone service provider [1,
2, 3]. The records cover approximately 10M subscribers within a single country over 3 years of
10
activity. Each billing record, for voice and text services, contains the unique identifiers of the caller
placing the call and the callee receiving the call; an identifier for the cellular antenna (tower) that
handled the call; and the date and time when the call was placed. Coupled with a dataset describing
the locations (latitude and longitude) of cellular towers, we have the approximate location of the
caller when placing the call. For full details, see Supporting Information S1, Sec. A.
Identifying events
To find an event in the mobile phone data, we need to determine its time and location. We have
used online news aggregators, particularly the local news.google.com service to search for news
stories covering the country and time frame of the dataset. Keywords such as ‘storm’, ‘emergency’,
‘concert’, etc. were used to find potential news stories. Important events such as bombings and
earthquakes are prominently covered in the media and are easy to find. Study of these reports,
which often included photographs of the affected area, typically yields precise times and locations
for the events. Reports would occasionally conflict about specific details, but this was rare. We
take the reported start time of the event as t = 0.
To identify the beginning and ending of an event, tstart and tstop, we adopt the following proce-
dure. First, identify the event region (a rough estimate is sufficient) and scan all its calls during
a large time period covering the event (e.g., a full day), giving Vevent(t). Then, scan calls for a
number of “normal” periods, those modulo one week from the event period, exploiting the weekly
periodicity of V(t). These normal periods’ time series are averaged to give 〈Vnormal〉. (To smooth
time series, we typically bin them into 5–10 minute intervals.) The standard deviation σ (Vnormal) as
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a function of time is then used to compute z(t) = ∆V(t)/σ (Vnormal). Finally, we define the interval(
tstart, tstop
)
as the longest contiguous run of time intervals where z(t) > zthr, for some fixed cutoff
zthr. We chose zthr = 1.5 for all events.
For full details, see Supporting Information S1, Sec. B.
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Table 1: Summary of the studied emergencies and non-emergencies. The columns provide the
duration of the anomalous call activity (Fig. 1), the spatial decay rate rc (Fig. 2), the number of users
in the event population |G0|, and the total size of the information cascade ∑i |Gi| (Fig. 3). Events
discussed in the main text are italicized, the rest are discussed in the supplementary material. ‘Jet
scare’ refers to a sonic boom interpreted by the local population and initial media reports as an
explosion.
Event duration (hours) rc (km) |G0| ∑i |Gi|
E
m
er
ge
nc
ie
s
1 Bombing 1.92 2.38 750 5,099
2 Plane crash 2.17 9.98 2,104 7,325
3 Earthquake 1.42 110 32,403 83,280
4 Blackout 3.0 3.02 84,751 288,332
5 Jet scare 1.67 6.18 3,556 11,575
6 Storm 1 2.33 27.0 7,350 18,124
7 Storm 2 2.0 4.29 14,634 33,963
8 Storm 3 1.75 2.79 19,239 48,626
N
on
-e
m
er
ge
nc
ie
s 9 Concert 1 13.25 0.48 11,376 91,889
10 Concert 2 6.67 1.06 3,939 29,837
11 Concert 3 9.08 1.48 5,134 81,125
12 Concert 4 12.08 0.35 2,630 17,998
13 Festival 1 19.92 0.36 66,869 454,687
14 Festival 2 2.17 0.50 1,453 7,963
15 Festival 3 20.92 1.33 10,854 427,839
16 Festival 4 11.25 0.72 3,117 16,822
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Call anomalies during emergencies. A, The time dependence of call volume V(t) in the vicinity
of four emergencies and two non-emergencies (See Table 1). B, The temporal behavior of the
relative call volume ∆V/ 〈Vnormal〉 of the events shown in A, where ∆V = Vevent − 〈Vnormal〉, Vevent
is the call volume on the day of the event (shown in red in A), and 〈Vnormal〉 is the average call
volume during the same period of the week (the call volume during the previous week is shown in
black in B). C, The relative change in the average number of calls placed per user (ρ) and the total
number of users (N) making calls from the region indicates that the call anomaly is primarily due
to a significant increase in the number of users that place calls during the events.
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The spatial impact of an emergency. A, Maps of total anomalous call activity (activity during
the event minus expected normal activity) for two-hour periods before (−2 < t < 0), during
(0 < t < 2), and after (2 < t < 4) the bombing. The color code corresponds to the total change∑
t ∆V(t), where the sum runs over the particular time period. B, Changes in call volume in regions
at various distances r from the event epicenter. Note that the peak of the call volume anomaly for
the bombing within the observed 1 < r < 5 km region is delayed by approximately 10 minutes
compared to the r < 1 km epicenter region. No call anomaly is observed for r > 10 km. The
earthquake covers a large spatial range so we instead choose three event regions A-C, at distances
of 310 km, 340 km, and 425 km from the seismic epicenter (which was outside the studied region).
C, To measure the distance dependence of the anomaly, we computed the total anomalous call
volume in B before (∆t < t < 0) and after (0 < t < ∆t) each event as a function of the distance
r, revealing approximately exponential decay, ∆V(r) ∼ exp (−r/rc). Non-emergencies are spatially
localized, with rc < 2 km.
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Social characteristics of information cascades. A, Changes in call volume for users directly
affected by the event (G0), users that receive calls from G0 but are not near the event (G1), users
contacted by G1 but not in G1 or G0 (G2), etc. For the bombing and plane crash, populations
respond very rapidly, within minutes. B, The total amount of anomalous call activity in A before
(during −∆t < t < 0) and after (during 0 < t < ∆t) the event for each user group Gi quantifies the
impact on the social network. We see that information propagates deeply into the social network
for the bombing and plane crash. C, Top panel: the contact network formed between affected
users during the bombing. Bottom panel: the call pattern between users that are active during the
emergency during the previous week, indicating that the information cascade observed during the
bombing is out of the ordinary. D, The distribution of shortest paths within the contact network
quantifies the anomalous information cascade induced by the bombing.
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Analyzing a composite event (evacuation preceding an explosion). A, Call activity increases
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t = 0 causes a much larger increase in call activity. B, Spatially, the evacuation causes a sharply
localized activity spike (rc = 1.6 km), but the explosion increases the spatial extent dramatically
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However, the blast not only leads to a further increase in call activity in the G0 and G1 groups, but
also triggers the second neighbors G2.
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Systematic response mechanisms during emergencies]Systematic response mechanisms during
emergencies. A, The midpoint fraction fmid quantifying the onset speed of anomalous call
activity (a lower fmid indicates a faster onset). Emergencies display a more abrupt call anomaly
than non-emergencies, which feature gradual buildups of anomalous call activity. B, The spatial
extent of the events, quantified by rc, indicates that non-emergency events are far more centrally
localized than unexpected emergencies. C, The relative cascade size R = Nevent/ 〈Nnormal〉, where
N =
∑
i |Gi| is the number of users in the social cascade. D, zF = (Pevent − 〈Pnormal〉) /σ (Pnormal),
where P is the probability of calling an acquaintance and σ(P) is the standard deviation of P.
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1 Summary of the studied emergencies and non-emergencies. The columns pro-
vide the duration of the anomalous call activity (Fig. 1), the spatial decay rate rc
(Fig. 2), the number of users in the event population |G0|, and the total size of the
information cascade
∑
i |Gi| (Fig. 3). Events discussed in the main text are itali-
cized, the rest are discussed in the supplementary material. ‘Jet scare’ refers to
a sonic boom interpreted by the local population and initial media reports as an
explosion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
B Global Activity Level and stop times for all sixteen events . . . . . . . . . . . . . S13
A Dataset
We use a set of anonymized billing records from a western european mobile phone service provider [1,
2, 3]. The records cover approximately 10M subscribers within a single country over 3 years of
activity. Each billing record, for voice and text services, contains the unique identifiers of the caller
placing the call and the callee receiving the call; an identifier for the cellular antenna (tower) that
handled the call; and the date and time when the call was placed. Coupled with a dataset describing
the locations (latitude and longitude) of cellular towers, we have the approximate location of the
caller when placing the call. Unless otherwise noted, a “call” can be either voice or text (SMS,
MMS, etc.), and “call volume” or “call activity” is both voice calls and text messages.
After identifying the start time and location of an event, we then scan these billing records to
determine the activity of nearby users. The mobile phone activity patterns of the affected users
can then be followed in the weeks preceding or following the event, to provide control or baseline
behavior.
Self-reported gender information is available for approximately 90% of subscribers.
A.1 Market share
These records cover approximately 20% of the country’s mobile phone market. However, we also
possess identification numbers for phones that are outside the provider but that make or receive
calls to users within the company. While we do not possess any other information about these
lines, nor anything about their users or calls that are made to other numbers outside the service
provider, we do have records pertaining to all calls placed to or from these ID numbers involving
subscribers covered by our dataset. This information was used to study social propagation (see
Sec. H.1).
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B Identifying events
To find an event in the mobile phone data, we need to determine its time and location. We have
used online news aggregators, particularly the local news.google.com service to search for news
stories covering the country and time frame of the dataset. Keywords such as ‘storm’, ‘emergency’,
‘concert’, etc. were used to find potential news stories. Important events such as bombings and
earthquakes are prominently covered in the media and are easy to find. Study of these reports,
which often included photographs of the affected area, typically yields precise times and locations
for the events. Reports would occasionally conflict about specific details, but this was rare. We
take the reported start time of the event as t = 0.
Most events are spatially localized, so it is important to consider only the immediate event
region. Otherwise, the event signal is masked by normal activity (Fig. A). The local event region
can be estimated as a circle centered on the identified epicenter with a radius chosen based on rc.
For the blackout, however, we chose all towers within the affected city (contained within the city’s
postal codes).
To identify the beginning and the end of an event, tstart and tstop, we adopt the following pro-
cedure. First, identify the event region (a rough estimate is sufficient) and scan all its calls during
a large time period covering the event (e.g., a full day), giving Vevent(t). Then, scan calls for a
number of “normal” periods, those modulo one week from the event period, exploiting the weekly
periodicity of V(t). These normal periods’ time series are averaged to give 〈Vnormal〉. (To smooth
time series, we typically bin them into 5–10 minute intervals.) The standard deviation σ (Vnormal) as
a function of time is then used to compute z(t) = ∆V(t)/σ (Vnormal). Finally, we define the interval(
tstart, tstop
)
as the longest contiguous run of time intervals where z(t) > zthr, for some fixed cutoff
zthr. We chose zthr = 1.5 for all events.
Finally, there is also the concern that an emergency may be so severe that it interferes with the
operations of the mobile phone system itself. Only the blackout caused any damage to the mobile
phone system, where some towers were temporarily disabled. (No calls appear to have been lost
as other towers picked up the slack.) See Fig. B. Likewise, no towers reached maximum capacity,
preventing important calls from being routed. Such effects may occur during larger, more serious
emergencies.
B.1 Missing events
It is possibile that newsworthy events may not be discoverable using mobile phones. Indeed, while
there are sixteen events documented in main text Table 1, there were a number of events discovered
in news reports that we could not identify in the data. The majority of these were forest fires. While
they affected large regions and numbers of people, we could not find them with mobile phones. A
large wind storm and a gas main explosion were also not confirmed; both occurred late at night.
Two other events, a chemical leak causing an evacuation and a fire at a remote factory causing
noxious fumes were discovered in the dataset, but the affected populations were very small, so we
decided to discount them.
The absence of these events in the dataset provides important information about the strengths
and weaknesses of using mobile phones to study emergencies. Since they rely on user activity,
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Figure A: Regional and national visibility of events. On a national level (a–c), the spike in call activity
due to the bombing is lost, but it clearly emerges when we focus only on the immediately local vicinity of
the event (d–f). The strong weekly periodicity in V(t) is also visible.
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Figure B: Spatial changes in call activity due to the blackout. We integrate call activity V(t) over two
time windows before and after the blackout occurs (left, shaded). Studying total call load spatially we see
a nonlinear response, with a region near the city center (star) suffering a drop in calls due to the blackout
(right). This region is surrounded by areas that display a significant increase in calls, implying that most
load was shifted onto nearby cell towers and was not lost.
events that occur late at night, when most people are asleep, may be difficult to study. Likewise,
events that are severe but diffuse, providing a slight effect over a very broad area, may not be
distinguishable from the background of normal activity (although the earthquake is an exception
to this). Events in remote locations with little cellular coverage will also be more difficult to study
than events in well-covered and well-populated regions.
Finally, since we are especially interested in studying how information propagates socially, we
avoided national events, such as televised sports matches or popular public holidays, as these make
distinguishing the different event populations Gi unreliable.
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C Source of call anomaly
The anomalous call activity raises an important question: is the observed spike due to individu-
als who normally do not use their phone in the event region and now suddenly choose to place
calls, or are those who normally use their phone in the respective timeframe prompted to call more
frequently than under normal circumstances? We determined in the event region (i) the relative
change in the average number of calls placed per user, ∆ρ/ 〈ρnormal〉, and (ii) the relative increase
in the number of individuals that use their phone in this period ∆N/ 〈Nnormal〉. Figure ?? shows that
during the bombing we see a 36% increase in phone usage whereas the number of individuals that
make a call increases by 232%. Other emergencies show a similar pattern: the plane crash, earth-
quake and blackout show increases in ρ (N) of 21% (67.5%), 1.36% (17.4%) and 4.97% (20.8%),
respectively. Taken together, these results indicate that the primary source of the observed call
anomaly is a sudden increase of calls by individuals who would normally not use their phone
during the emergency period, a behavioral change triggered by the witnessed event.
D Whom do people call
To see if affected users tend to call existing friends or contact strangers, we measured the proba-
bility P for a user in G0 to make his first call between tstart and tstop to a friend, where ‘friends’ are
the set of individuals that have had phone contact with the G0 user during the previous full three
months (not including the month of the event). Computing the mean and standard deviation of P
over normal time periods (all weekdays of the month of the event, except the day of the event)
allows us to quantify the relative change during the event with
zF =
Pevent − 〈Pnormal〉
σ (Pnormal)
. (S1)
In all emergencies we observe an increase in the number of calls placed to friends (and a corre-
sponding decrease in calls to non-friends). Many non-emergencies show the opposite trend: users
are less likely to call a friend, although this change is seldom large. See Sec. G and Fig. 5d.
E Gender response during events
To investigate how the population response to events depends on demographic factors, we used
the self-reported gender information, available for the majority (∼88%) of the users. For each
event we compute the significance zfemale and zmale in the fraction of female and male users active
during the event, compared with normal time periods, as described in D, for both directly affected
users (G0) and those one step away (G1). As shown in Fig. C, we see that nearly all emergencies
cause an increase in the fraction of affected female users; this increase is significant for half of
the emergencies. Non-emergencies do not result in deviations in the gender breakdown of affected
populations. These results hold for both the directly affected users and their neighbors one step
away.
S5
z fe
m
ale
G0 G1
-2
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
Bo
m
bin
g
Pl
an
e 
cr
as
h
Je
t s
ca
re
Ea
rth
qu
ak
e
St
or
m
 2
St
or
m
 1
Bl
ac
ko
ut
St
or
m
 3
Co
nc
er
t 4
Co
nc
er
t 1
Fe
sti
va
l 2
Co
nc
er
t 3
Co
nc
er
t 2
Fe
sti
va
l 4
Fe
sti
va
l 1
Fe
sti
va
l 3
z m
ale
-8
-6
-4
-2
 0
 2
Figure C: Gender response during emergency and non-emergency events. For each event we compute
the significance zfemale and zmale in the fraction of female and male users active during the event, compared
with normal time periods, for both directly affected users (G0) and those one step away (G1). We see that
nearly all emergencies cause an increase in the fraction of affected female users; this increase is significant
for half of the emergencies. Non-emergencies do not result in deviations in the gender breakdown of affected
populations.
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Figure D: Voice and text usages during emergencies. Most events do not show a significant change in
the fraction of voice calls compared to text messages. The earthquake and blackout are exceptions, as is the
plane crash and festival 3 (G1 only).
F Voice versus text usage during events
Similar to the quantities zF and zfemale, we can assess whether users have changed their means of
communication due to an event. To do so we compute the significance zvoice of the fraction of voice
calls compared to text messages during the event, for both populations G0 and G1 (Fig. D). The
earthquake and blackout give significantly increased text usage while the plane crash shows an
increase in voice, while most other events do not show a significant change. Since the earthquake
and blackout were both relatively minor (low danger) events, this result implies that a spike in
primarily text messaging activity may indicate that the event is a low-threat/non-critical emergency.
G Systematic response mechanisms during emergencies
As mentioned in the main text, to summarize our current understanding of these events, we com-
puted temporal, spatial, and social properties for each anomaly, plotted in main text Fig. 5. Tem-
porally, we study the midpoint fraction:
fmid = (tmid − tstart) /
(
tstop − tstart
)
, (S2)
the fraction of time required for half of the anomalous call activity to occur, where tmid satisfies:∫ tmid
tstart
(Vevent(t) − Vnormal(t)) dt = 12
∫ tstop
tstart
(Vevent(t) − Vnormal(t)) dt. (S3)
The midpoint fraction is more robust to noisy and non-sharply peaked time series, where estimating
tpeak is difficult, than the peak fraction. Spatially, we use the anomaly’s rc. Socially, we compute
S7
two quantities: the relative size of the cascade R (the number of people in the event cascade divided
by the number generated under normal periods; see Sec. H.2 and Fig. H) and zF, the significance
in the probability of calling a friend compared with a non-friend (see Sec. D).
Figure 5 shows a distinct separation in these measures between emergencies and non-emergencies,
indicating that there are universal response patterns underlying societal dynamics independent of
the particular event details.
H Calculating social propagation
In this section we detail the procedure for extracting the contact network between users after an
event (Sec. H.1) and how to control for various factors to demonstrate whether or not the contact
network or its information cascade is anomalous due to the event (Sec. H.2).
H.1 Constructing the time-dependent contact network
We use the following process to generate the contact network between users due to an event. We
follow all messages in order of occurrence during the event’s time interval
[
tstart, tstop
]
. While we do
not know the content of the messages, we assume that any related messages do transmit information
pertaining to the event. A user u who does not know about the event becomes “infected” with
knowledge due to communication at some time t ∈
[
tstart, tstop
]
if (1) u initiated communication
from a tower within the event region or (2) u communicated with a user that was already infected.
We place u in the set G0 if u communicated from the event region, otherwise we place u into
Gi+1 where the infected user transmitting knowledge to u was in Gi. Following these calls and
generating the Gi with this procedure then forms the contact network. Note that there are two
types of communications in the dataset, voice and text. We assume that voice is bidirectional
whereas text messages are not (a user who sends a text message to someone with knowledge of
the event will learn nothing from that particular communication). An illustration of this process is
depicted in Fig. E.
The contact network itself can be studied using a number of network science tools. One way to
analyze the size and scale of this network is through the distribution of shortest (or geodesic) path
lengths [4]. In Fig. ?? we presented the distribution of paths emanating from G0 users within the
giant connected component (GCC) of the bombing’s network. One can also analyze the distribution
for all users, not just G0, and for all components of the network. These possibilities are shown in
Fig. F.
Finally, the cascade of information through a contact network is a non-local process which may
be highly effected by sampling/percolation [4]. Indeed, the mobile phone dataset contains only
users of a single phone company, and a number of propagation paths may be missing. However,
the dataset actually contains all users who make or receive calls to users within the company, even
those outside the company. This means we have all cascade paths of one or two steps that begin and
end with in-company users (regardless of whether they travel through a company user or not) and
that those paths are the actual shortest paths, providing an effective lower bound on the cascade.
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Figure E: Extracting the time-dependent contact network from call data. A, A cartoon example of the
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Figure F: Distributions of short-
est paths found within the bomb-
ing’s contact network. One can com-
pute shortest paths emanating from
all users (top) or only users in G0
(bottom) and for paths within the en-
tire network (left) or only the net-
work’s giant component (right).
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In other words, if we can demonstrate the existence of a cascade over users {G0,G1,G2}, then the
actual cascade containing those users can only be larger.
H.2 Controlling for social propagation
A contact network between users can always be constructed, even when no event takes place. There
may appear to be propagating cascades as well, since there are temporal correlations between users
receiving and then placing calls. This must be properly controlled for.
Suppose we are studying an event and have identified its affected users G0, those users that
made calls during some time window (t, t + ∆t). We expect that G0 users will call other users (G1)
outside the event, G1 users will call G2 users, etc., generating a cascade {G0,G1, . . .}. Tracking
calls starting from some G will always generate such groups, even during normal periods. Then
the question is, do the users in Gi, i > 0 show increased activity during an emergency or other
event? If so, that is evidence of the social propagation of situational awareness.
To answer this question we need to consider several points:
• Suppose that the total call activity for a region is V(t) (Fig. GA). Now select a group of users
G∆t that each place at least one call during a small time window ∆t. Tracking only their call
activity generates the conditional time series V(t|G∆t). This time series has a “selection bias”
that creates the appearance of a large increase in activity during the time window since all
the users must place calls then (Fig. GB). This must be accounted for when studying selected
users during an event.
• When tracking V(t|G) for a group of N = |G| users, the overall level of activity will depend
on N (Fig. GC). A rescaling is necessary when comparing the activity levels of different size
groups.
• The selection bias will also depend on the length of the time window ∆t. If ∆t = 24 hours
had been used in Fig. G, no bias would be evident. All events are compared to time periods
with the same ∆t, so this effect is automatically controlled for.
Having considered these aspects, we turn our attention to the problem of calculating the cas-
cade itself. For the event period, tracking the outgoing calls of {G0,G1, . . .} is straightforward.
To determine how unusual this activity is, we need controls for comparison. There are several
possibilities:
Control 1 One option is scanning the event region during the same time of the week, collecting a
control population of users, and then following their cascade. However, this does not account
for changes in the composition or number of users in the event region (some studied events
were quite remote and typically contained very few users).
Control 2 Another possibility is to simply follow the activity of the same usersGi from the event’s
cascade during normal time periods. This choice is keeps the population unchanged but it
does not account for changes in who is being called; G0 users may have chosen to call very
different people during an emergency. Further, it does not account for the selection bias that
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Figure G: Understanding selection bias. A, The call volume V(t) of a major city during an ordinary
24-hour period. B, The call volume V(t|G) of N = 104 randomly selected users from A who all placed one
or more calls between 12:00 and 14:00 (highlighted). The ‘bias’ of this conditional time series is clear. C,
The same as B for different values of N. Rescaling by the population size (inset) indicates that the relative
scale of the bias of V(t|G) during the time window is independent of the population size.
is present during the event but not during the normal periods, which may exaggerate the
change in call activity.
Control 3 Finally, one can study new cascades generated by the same event users G0 during nor-
mal periods, creating a different cascade {G0, g1, g2, . . .} for each normal period. The activ-
ities of each Gi can then be compared to those of the corresponding gi’s. This directly tests
the effect that the initiating population G0 has on the cascade, by studying those cascades the
population would normally induce, and accounts for selection bias since this bias is present
during the event and the normal periods.
We have chosen to use Control 3. Note that Gi will typically be larger than the normal gi’s and
thatGi users may be more active than those in gi, so V(t|gi) must be rescaled when being compared
to the event’s V(t|Gi). To do this, we multiply V(t|gi) by a constant scaling factor ai,
ai =
∫
δt
V(τ|Gi) dτ
/∫
δt
V(τ|gi) dτ , (S4)
where both integrals run over the same “calibration interval” δt and τ = 0 is the start of the selection
window. For most events we integrate over a 24-hour period two days before the window, δt =
(−48,−24). If the event is on a weekday, we ensure the calibration interval is not a weekend and
vice versa. This factor ai was chosen such that the total number of calls during normal time periods
for V(t|Gi) is approximately equal to aiV(t|gi), equalizing the smaller time series and removing bias
due to |Gi| , |gi|.
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Control 3 and Eq. S4 allow one to compare disparate populations’ call activities, but there are
two subtle yet important details to consider when comparing event and normal contact networks:
1. The event contact network under Control 3 consists of users
{
Ge0,G
e
1,G
e
2, . . .
}
while the con-
tact network for normal period n contains users
{
Ge0, g
n
1, g
n
2, . . .
}
. As shown in Fig. ??, many
members ofGe0 will be silent during each period n. This means that the cascade during period
n is actually generated by a smaller set of users gen0 ⊂ Ge0, defined as those users in Ge0 who
also make calls during period n. The rescaling factors ai account for this when comparing
activity levels V(t|G) but this may give an unfair advantage to the growth of the event contact
network, as quantified by the relative cascade size R, when compared to normal periods. For
example, an event may result in R > 1 simply because the event period’s “seed” population
is larger than that of the normal period. See Fig. HA.
To control for this effect, we compute Ge0 for the event and use it to generate g
en
0 for each
period n. We then return to the original event period and track a new event cascade for
each gen0 . In other words, we consider only the smaller cascade
{
gen0 , g
en
1 , . . .
}
formed by
following only users who are normally active during that time of day. This means there are
now different event cascades corresponding to each normal period. See Fig. HB.
2. There is a tendency for non-emergencies to occur later in the day than the emergency events.
Most concerts are held at night, for example. Users are generally more active during this
time of day; many users have plans with free nightly minutes. This factor is not an issue for
activity levels V(t) since these are always compared during the same time of day. However,
this may give an additional advantage when e.g., comparing R for an event that occurs early
in the morning to an event that occurs during peak call activity. The latter cascade occurs
when users are generally more active, increasing the number of potential propagation vectors
and possibly increasing the rate at which new members are added to the Gi’s.
A simple way to control for this is the following. First, compute the Global Activity Level
(GAL), the total number of phone calls in the entire dataset during each event’s time win-
dow. Then, pick the event that contains the lowest GAL and shorten all the time windows
(decreasing tstop only) for the other events such that they have the same minimum GAL.
Finally, generate the contact network during these reduced windows only. Doing this guar-
antees that every event has the same number of possible communications to propagate along.
This process was used for all computations of R.
With this machinery in hand, we can now successfully demonstrate that there are anomalously
large cascades for many emergencies, especially the bombing. Not only is R > 1 (Figs. 5c and H)
but the contact populations show anomalous increases in call activity, even after all controls are
in place (Figs. ??, ??, L, and M). All non-emergencies generate ordinarily-sized contact networks
(Figs. 5c and H) and normal activity levels (Figs. ??, ??, N, and O).
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Figure H: Controlling factors that affect the
relative cascade size. A, Relative cascade size
R = Nevent/ 〈Nnormal〉, where Nevent = ∑i |Gei |
and 〈Nnormal〉 = |Ge0| + 〈
∑
i>0
∣∣∣gni ∣∣∣〉n (averaged
over normal events n). B, Relative cascade size
using R = 〈∑i |geni |/∑ j |gnj |〉n, controlling for
the lower activity level during normal period
n with gen0 ⊂ Ge0. With this control, all non-
emergencies have R < 1 and all emergencies
have R & 1 (Storm 3 has R = 1.0044).
Event GAL tstop (min) t′stop (min)
E
m
er
ge
nc
ie
s
1 Bombing 2,327,592 120 65
2 Plane crash 1,497,402 120 99
3 Earthquake 1,370,268 60 60
4 Blackout 4,536,253 180 51
5 Jet scare 1,320,363 80 77
6 Storm 1 3,701,872 135 48
7 Storm 2 1,266,468 115 115
8 Storm 3 2,654,849 120 51
N
on
-e
m
er
ge
nc
ie
s 9 Concert 1 8,136,294 360 4610 Concert 2 6,512,493 240 45
11 Concert 3 10,384,830 540 49
12 Concert 4 6,473,695 690 42
13 Festival 1 13,782,768 960 74
14 Festival 2 6,095,958 1,200 42
15 Festival 3 19,504,204 1,200 90
16 Festival 4 10,386,001 730 89
Table B: Global Activity Level (GAL) and stop times for all sixteen events. show the original tstop and
modified t′stop that equalizes all events’ GAL. Storm 2 had the smallest GAL over the corpus.
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Figure I: Regional call activity for the eight emergencies analyzed. The first four are also shown in main
text Fig. ??. Shaded regions indicate ±2 standard deviations.
I Results on the event corpus
Sixteen events were identified for this work (see main text Table 1), but six events were focused
upon in the main text. Here we report the results for all events. In Figs. I and J we provide the
call activities V(t) for all sixteen events used in this study (compare to Fig. 1). In Fig. K we show
∆V(r) for the ten events not shown in main text Fig. ??. Finally in Figs. L, M, N, and O we present
activity levels V(t|Gi) for G0 through G3 for all 16 events.
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Figure J: The same as Fig. I for the eight non-emergencies. Concert 3 takes place at an otherwise unpopu-
lated location and the normal activity is not visible on a scale showing the event activity.
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Figure K: Spatial call activity for the ten events not shown in main text Fig. ??.
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Figure L: Social propagation for the four main text emergencies. Shown are the activity patterns (condi-
tional time series) for G0 through G3 during the event (black curve) and normally (shaded regions indicate
±2 s.d.). Normal activity levels were rescaled to account for population and selection bias (see Sec. H) The
bombing and plane crash show increased activities for multiple Gi while the earthquake and blackout do not.
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Figure M: Same as Fig. L for the remaining emergency events.
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Figure N: Same as Fig. L for the concerts. All concerts show extra activity only for G0 except Concert 4,
which shows a small increase in activity for G1 several hours after the concert started.
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Figure O: Same as Fig. L for the festivals. Interestingly, Festival 2 shows no extra activity, even for G0,
indicating that the call anomaly for those events was caused only by a greater-than-expected number of users
all making an expected number of calls.
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